Plaintiffs in both medical malpractice cases argued preferred venue existed in Marion County, Indiana because one or more of the defendants had registered agents with office addresses in Marion County. However, the healthcare Defendants in these cases argued that preferred venue did not lie in Marion County because a new Indiana statute provides that “[t]he address of [an entity’s registered] agent does not determine venue in an action or a proceeding involving the entity.” Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12.

The Indiana Court of Appeals in Morrison v. Vasquez, 107 N.E.3d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) held that Marion County, Indiana was not a preferred venue based upon the address of the defendant’s registered agent, whereas the Court in Indiana Univ. Health S. Indiana Physicians, Inc. v. Noel, 114 N.E.3d 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) held that preferred venue lied in Marion County.

In reviewing these split decisions, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to apply American Family, finding American Family was no longer controlling law because it was premised on statutory provisions that have been repealed and replaced by the new business corporation statutes. The Court further reasoned that American Family, even if controlling, did not apply to domestic corporations. In Morrison and Noel, the corporations at issue were domestic, but had registered agents in different counties than the actual principal executive offices of the corporations.

The Indiana Supreme Court held in Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217 (Ind. 2019) that a domestic organization’s actual principal office and not the location of its registered agent is the appropriate preferred venue. The Court further held that in light of the new statutes defining “principal office,” Ind. Code § 23-0.5-1.5-29, and providing that a registered agent’s location does not determine preferred venue, Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12, the location of a registered agent does not determine preferred venue for either domestic or foreign corporations. Lastly, the Court held that the new business corporation statutes could be applied retroactively to the plaintiff in Morrison because preferred venue was not determined by the trial court in that case until after the enactment of the statutes, and even though the statutes were enacted after the filing of the complaint, procedural statutes, as opposed to substantive statutes, may be applied retroactively.

Preferred venue for cases can exist in more than one court or county in Indiana. One of the ten (10) subsections of Indiana Trial Rule 75 provides for preferred venue in “the county where… the principal office of a defendant organization is located…” Ind. R. Trial P. 75(A)(4).

The Indiana Court of Appeals’ split decisions arise from medical malpractice cases filed in Marion County, Indiana. The defendants sought to have the cases transferred to other counties, namely Monroe County, Indiana and Lawrence County, Indiana. Although Indiana procedural law enacted by Indiana’s legislature provides that “[t]he address of [an entity’s registered] agent does not determine venue in an action or a proceeding involving the entity,” Ind. Code § 23-0.5-4-12, the Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted the term “principal office” as used in Indiana Trial Rule 75(A)(4) and (10) as “the place in Indiana where one serves the corporate registered agent.” Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 857 N.E.2d 971, 975 (Ind. 2006) (American Family).

The plaintiffs argued in both cases that preferred venue existed in Marion County, Indiana because one or more of the defendants had registered agents with office addresses in Marion County, Indiana. They argued that Indiana Code § 23-0.5-4-12 was inapplicable and/or a nullity as a result of the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision and precedent in American Family.

Under well-established Indiana law, if a conflict exists between a procedural statute and a rule adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court, the rule takes precedence and “all laws in conflict with the supreme court’s rules have no further force or effect.” Ind. Code § 34-8-1-3. Indiana Trial Rule 75(D) further provides that “any special or general statute relating to venue” shall be subject to Indiana Trial Rule 75 and “any statute fixing more stringent rules thereon shall be ineffective.”

The Indiana Court of Appeals in Morrison v. Vasquez, 107 N.E.3d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) declined to find that Indiana Code § 23-0.5-4-12 fixed a more stringent rule or was otherwise ineffective under Indiana Trial Rule 75(D) and held that Marion County, Indiana was not a preferred venue based upon the address of the defendant’s registered agent.

The Indiana Court of Appeals in Indiana Univ. Health S. Indiana Physicians, Inc. v. Noel, 2018 WL 5813083 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2018), however, held that preferred venue lied in Marion County, Indiana because Indiana Code § 23-0.5-4-12 conflicts with Indiana Trial Rule 75(A)(4) as interpreted by the Indiana Supreme Court in American Family, thus making the statute a nullity.