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Articles Posted in Land Owner Liability

Indiana Supreme Court Adopts Bright-Line Rule that Landowners Owe No Duty to the Traveling Public from Conditions Wholly Contained on Property Despite any Visual Obstruction

Published on: November 11, 2021 | by Barsumian Armiger

We previously wrote about the Indiana Court of Appeals decision in Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. affirming a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a property owner finding the property owner owed no duty to the traveling public as a result of tall grass on its property. In Reece, Judy Reece (“Reece”), as wife and guardian of Walter Reece, sued Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. and Tyson Foods, Inc. (collectively “Tyson”) because tall grass on Tyson’s property impeded the view of a driver, Harold Moistner, who pulled out into an intersection causing a collision between himself and Walter Reece. Walter Reece suffered catastrophic brain injuries in the collision.

The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer in Reece and adopted a bright-line rule: landowners owe a duty to passing motorists on adjacent highways not to create hazardous conditions that visit themselves upon the roadway; but when a land use or condition that may impose a visual obstruction is wholly contained on a landowner’s property, there is no duty to the traveling public. Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 173 N.E.3d 1031, 1034, 1041 (Ind. 2021).

In adopting this bright-line rule, the Indiana Supreme Court surveyed numerous prior landowner negligence cases. Factors noted in the prior cases included harms caused by conditions contained on land and those intruding upon the roadway, natural versus artificial conditions, and population density. As to its bright-line rule, the Court specifically noted that Indiana’s state and local legislatures could enact laws imposing different duties on landowners. The Court also noted that its decision did not apply to situations where a motorist comes in contact with a condition wholly contained on the land.

Indiana Court of Appeals Finds Indiana City Immune from Liability for Potholes Causing Bicyclist’s Crash

Published on: October 14, 2021 | by Barsumian Armiger

A divided Indiana Court of Appeals recently found Michigan City immune from liability for a bicyclist’s injuries caused by a large pothole in a street. In Johnson v. City of Michigan City, Laura Johnson (“Johnson”) struck a large pothole in a street while riding her bicycle, which caused her to crash and suffer a tibial plateau fracture. Michigan City (“the City”) was responsible for maintaining the street. The City used a rating system to decide which streets to repair in any given year. The City’s engineering staff would decide which streets to repair based upon annual consulting reports that would evaluate 20% of the streets each year, with every street inspected every 5 years. The engineering staff would create a budget for resurfacing, the City would then contract with consultants to plan the projects, and the City’s Board of Works would approve individual projects for bidding. The engineering staff would also keep track of citizen complaints and consider them along with the street inspections in prioritizing street repairs. The City’s process for responding to complaints about individual potholes entailed the City’s Street Department receiving the complaint, preparing a work order, and then sending a crew to patch the pothole.

Prior to the accident in this case, the City had already decided the subject street needed to be resurfaced. The Board of Works had already approved the project for bidding, which was in process at the time of Johnson’s crash. In the month prior to Johnson’s crash, the City had also received two complaints about the street, one from a member of the LaPorte County Board of Commissioners describing the street as being in “dire shape,” and another complaint indicating the street had a “severe pothole problem,” which was causing cars to weave across lanes to avoid the potholes. The street was eventually resurfaced around 5-6 months after Johnson’s crash.

Johnson sued the City for negligence in causing her injuries. The City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was immune from liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, which grants immunity to governmental entities under some circumstances, including “[t]he performance of a discretionary function.” Indiana law distinguishes between planning and operational functions. Planning functions, which are afforded immunity, are “acts or omissions in the exercise of a legislative, judicial, or executive or planning function that involve formulation of basic policy decisions characterized by official judgment or discretion in weighing alternatives and choosing public policy.” Operational functions, such as the “execution or implementation of already formulated policy,” are not discretionary and are not afforded immunity. The purpose of governmental discretionary function immunity for planning and policy-making activities is to allow governments freedom to deal with difficult policy issues without the prospect of liability.

Grocery Store Landowner Not Responsible for Patrons’ Injuries Arising from Vehicle-Pedestrian Collision in Parking Lot

Published on: September 17, 2021 | by Barsumian Armiger

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently found in favor of a grocery store landlord in a premise liability claim for personal injuries arising out of a vehicle-pedestrian collision in a grocery store parking lot. In Poppe v. Angell Enterprises, Inc., Paul Poppe and Susan Poppe were struck by an intoxicated driver and injured as they exited a grocery store. When they exited the store, the Poppes walked through a marked crosswalk to reach their vehicle, which was parked in a handicapped parking spot. As they were walking, they saw a quickly approaching truck and tried to run to get out of the way; however, the truck pinned them against their vehicle. Angell Enterprises, Inc. (“Angell”) was the landlord of the grocery store and responsible for maintaining the grocery store parking lot. In their injury lawsuit filed against Angell and other parties, the Poppes alleged that Angell was liable in part for their injuries by the condition of the parking lot in “the funneling of pedestrian and vehicular traffic” into the crosswalk without “protective features” such as “bollards,” which are protective posts often used in areas with vehicular and pedestrian traffic.

At the time of the appeal in this case, Angell was the sole remaining defendant. To succeed in their claim against Angell, the Poppes were required to prove (1) Angell owed them a duty of care, (2) Angell breached that duty, and (3) Angell’s breach proximately caused their injuries. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide, and absent a duty, there can be no breach and therefore no liability. Angell moved for summary judgment in court arguing that it owed the Poppes no duty and therefore was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Angell, and the Poppes appealed.

To decide whether Angell owed the Poppes a duty, the Indiana Court of Appeals was first required to decide whether to apply the landowner liability analytical framework in Burrell v. Meads (based upon Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 343) that applies when injuries result from a condition on land, or the analytical framework in Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc. that applies when injuries result from the criminal acts of a third person. The Burrell analysis provides that a landowner is responsible for injuries to invitees resulting from a condition on land but only if the landowner knew, or should have known, of the condition and that it involved an unreasonable danger of harm, if the landowner should have expected its invitees would not realize the danger or protect themselves against it, and if the landowner failed to exercise reasonable care to protect its invitees. The Goodwin foreseeability analysis of duty in the case of criminal acts of third parties causing injuries focuses on the “broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence,” and turns on “whether there is some probability or likelihood of harm that is serious enough to induce a reasonable person to take precautions to avoid it.”

Indiana Supreme Court Finds Store Manager Not Liable for Negligence in Wal-Mart Trip-and-Fall Personal Injury Lawsuit

Published on: April 16, 2021 | by Barsumian Armiger

The Indiana Supreme Court recently opined on a certified question from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana that a Wal-Mart store manager could not be held liable for negligence for a trip-and-fall incident that occurred in the store on account of alleged failures to properly hire, train, and supervise Wal-Mart’s employees, as well as alleged failures to implement proper safety policies and procedures. In Branscomb v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., the Court considered the certified question when Wal-Mart and the store manager sought to remove the case from state court to federal court under federal diversity jurisdiction upon the basis that the store manager, Clark, an Indiana citizen, was fraudulently joined to the lawsuit, was not a proper party to the case, and, therefore, his citizenship should be ignored, leaving only Wal-Mart, a non-Indiana citizen, as a defendant. After Wal-Mart removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, Plaintiffs sought to remand the matter back to state court, alleging questions of fact existed as to the store manager’s role in the negligence giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ injuries. The federal court noted there was no clear precedent on the issue and, therefore, certified the question to the Indiana Supreme Court.

In analyzing the question, Indiana’s Supreme Court noted that although Indiana recognizes the tort of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, the tort is not applicable if the tortfeasor employee is acting in the course and scope of employment. Branscomb had suffered injuries when he tripped over a pallet in the Wal-Mart garden center, leading to his fall. Looking at the allegations of the case, the court observed that the facts made no suggestion that the individual who placed a pallet on the floor in Wal-Mart’s garden center had been acting outside the scope of their employment and the Plaintiffs had made no such allegation. Consequently, under these particular allegations, the court found the Plaintiffs could only possibly hold Wal-Mart liable for the personal injuries sustained for which they were seeking recovery in their lawsuit.

As for the other allegations—that the store manager failed to implement proper safety policies and procedures to prevent the trip-and-fall event—the store manager submitted an affidavit stating that managers in his position do not have any discretion to unilaterally determine safety policies and procedures for the store, which discretion is, instead, given by “managers from higher up the Wal-Mart corporate ladder.” The court then turned to Indiana premise liability law, which provides only a possessor, controller, or person entitled to “immediate occupation” of the land has a duty to business invitees, like Branscomb, to prevent foreseeable harm from dangers on the land that were known or should have been known by the person. Because the Wal-Mart store manager accused of negligence did not possess the land, was not in control of the land when the fall occurred (it was his day off), and there were others who were entitled to occupy the land with intent to control it while the manager was off duty, the manager did not owe Branscomb a duty at the time of his fall under Indiana law.

Summary Judgment for Cemetery in Indiana Premise Liability Case Affirmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals

Published on: April 2, 2021 | by Barsumian Armiger

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a cemetery in an Indiana premise liability case. In Lowrey v. SCI Funeral Servs., Inc., Donald Lowrey and Barbara Lowrey were visiting their daughter’s interment site at the Elm Ridge Funeral Home & Memorial Park in Muncie, Indiana. As the Lowreys were walking on a sidewalk around a mausoleum in an attempt to return to the cemetery’s parking lot, Donald attempted to step across the grassy corner of two perpendicular sidewalks stepping from one sidewalk to the other sidewalk. However, when Donald stepped his foot did not make it completely onto the intersecting sidewalk, and as a result, his ankle rolled and he fell to the ground, striking his wife Barbara, who also fell. Donald and Barbara were both injured as a result of their falls and they sued the cemetery.

In their personal injury lawsuit, the Lowreys alleged the cemetery was negligent in maintaining its sidewalks due to ground/soil erosion at the corner of the two intersecting sidewalks. In support of their claims, the Lowreys presented a report from a professional engineer who determined there was a two-to-three-inch drop-off from the sidewalk to the ground at the corner of the sidewalks, the erosion of the ground at the corner of the sidewalks was due to the direction of drainage, and the cemetery’s failure to keep the ground flush with the sidewalks caused Donald’s fall. The cemetery filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was not negligent as a matter of law. After holding a hearing, the trial court granted the cemetery’s motion, and the Lowreys appealed.

Indiana has adopted Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in premise liability cases, which provides that a property owner is liable for injuries to persons invited onto their property caused by a condition on their property if the owner (1) knew of, or should have discovered, the condition and that it involved an unreasonable danger, (2) should have expected persons invited onto the property would not realize the danger or protect themselves against it, and (3) the property owner failed to exercise reasonable care to protect such persons against the danger. However, under Section 343A of the Restatement, if a danger is known or obvious to an invitee, a property owner will not be liable unless the property owner should have anticipated the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. Importantly, property owners are not insurers of their invitees’ safety, and the fact that a fall occurred is not sufficient in and of itself to prove negligence.

Indiana Court of Appeals Questions Indiana Supreme Court Precedent Concerning Governmental Immunity for Car Crash Injuries Resulting from Temporary Conditions of Roadways Due to Weather

Published on: March 4, 2021 | by Barsumian Armiger

Governmental entities in Indiana have a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep roadways and sidewalks reasonably safe for travel. However, governmental entities also enjoy immunity under certain circumstances. In two recent cases dealing with governmental immunity for losses caused by temporary conditions of roadways resulting from weather, the Indiana Court of Appeals has questioned and raised concerns with the Indiana Supreme Court’s analytical framework set forth in the 2002 decision of Catt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cty., 779 N.E. 2d 1 (Ind. 2002).

The plaintiff in Catt was injured when his vehicle slid and crashed into a ditch in Knox County caused by a washed-out culvert following a rainstorm the night before. The culvert had washed out many times prior to Catt’s car accident and had been repaired. The plaintiff alleged Knox County had negligently inspected, designed or maintained the roadway. However, the Indiana Supreme Court held Knox County, despite any negligence, was immune from liability under section 34-13-3-3(3) of the Indiana Tort Claims Act, which provides “[a] governmental entity… is not liable if a loss results from… [t]he temporary condition of a public thoroughfare… that results from weather.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(3). The Court framed the question as whether the washed-out culvert was due to weather and whether Knox County had the opportunity to repair the washed-out culvert and failed to do so (i.e., whether it was temporary versus permanent), regardless of any prior negligent inspection, design or maintenance or the frequency with which the culvert may have washed out on prior occasions. Since the washed-out culvert was caused by weather, Knox County had not received notice that it had washed out on this occasion prior to the collision, and Knox County was busy repairing other washed-out culverts and had previously repaired this one, the Court found the washed-out culvert was caused by weather and was a temporary condition.

In subsequent cases based on Catt, the Indiana Supreme Court has further explained that governmental immunity for temporary conditions resulting from weather applies during the “window of reasonable response” to the road condition. That window lasts until the condition stabilizes. That is, if the condition continues to worsen or is still evolving, the condition has not stabilized and is therefore deemed temporary, and the government is immune.

Indiana Court of Appeals Finds Landowner Owed No Duty to Motorist Injured As a Result of Tall Grass on Land Adjoining Roadway

Published on: November 23, 2020 | by Barsumian Armiger

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a property owner finding it had no duty to the traveling public as a result of tall grass on its property. In Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., a 92-year-old motorist, Harold Moistner (“Moistner”), pulled out into an intersection and collided with a motorcycle being driven by Walter Reece. Walter suffered catastrophic brain injuries in the motorcycle-vehicle collision. The investigating police officer completed a report and documented that tall grass on the northwest side of the intersection would have limited or prohibited Moistner’s view of Walter on his motorcycle. Judy Reece (“Reece”), individually and as Walter’s guardian, filed a lawsuit against various defendants, including Moistner and Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. and Tyson Foods, Inc. (collectively “Tyson”), which owned a plant on the northwest side of the intersection. Tyson moved for summary judgment as to duty, which the trial court granted.

To prove negligence in Indiana, a plaintiff must show the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, and the breach proximately caused injuries to the plaintiff. Whether one party owes another party a duty is generally a question of law for the court to decide. If there is no duty owed by the defendant, there can be no breach and therefore no negligence. Although Moistner certainly owed Reece a duty under the rules of the road applicable to motorists, whether a landowner owes a motorist operating a vehicle on a public roadway presents an interesting question for auto accident attorneys and the courts.

Under well-established Indiana law, a landowner owes a duty to the traveling public to exercise reasonable care in the use of his property so as not to interfere with the safety of public travelers on adjacent roadways. Courts have, for instance, found a duty of care on behalf of a railroad when its employees started a fire that caused smoke to blow over a nearby road obstructing the view of motorists, on behalf of a manufacturing plant that created a congestion of vehicles exiting the plant resulting in a collision, and on behalf of a landowner whose tree fell on a roadway. However, there is generally no liability for harm caused outside land by a natural condition on the land, except for unreasonable risks of harm from trees in urban areas, and even with respect to artificial conditions, there is no liability except for the creation of hazardous conditions that intrude upon a roadway. Thus, there is no duty where the activity is wholly contained on a landowner’s property.

Indiana Court of Appeals Upholds Icy Sidewalk Slip and Fall Jury Verdict Against Non-Property-Owning Grocery Store

Published on: November 6, 2020 | by Barsumian Armiger

As cold weather with the potential for snow and ice accumulations in store parking lots and on sidewalks approaches, the Indiana Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Pioneer Retail, LLC v. Jones is a reminder to businesses that despite not being an owner of the property, businesses can still be held liable for injuries to their invitees. In this case, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a significant jury verdict for a woman who suffered severe injuries in a fall on ice on a sidewalk outside a Wiseway Food grocery store in Crown Point, Indiana. Plaintiff Jane Jones (“Jones”) filed suit against Pioneer Retail, LLC (“Pioneer”), which owned and operated the Wiseway Food grocery store, the owner of the property where the Wiseway Food grocery store was located, a management company for the property, and a snow and ice removal contractor. Prior to trial, Pioneer filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it did not owe any duty of care to Jones. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Pioneer’s motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals denied its interlocutory appeal. The case proceeded to a jury trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Jones, with 25% fault apportioned to Pioneer and 75% fault apportioned to the other defendants.

Pioneer appealed and argued on appeal that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment. Pioneer argued it neither owned nor controlled the sidewalk where Jones fell. Pioneer argued the property owner was the exclusive owner of the sidewalk with ultimate responsibility for keeping it clear of snow and ice. Pioneer pointed to the fact that the property owner had contracted with a snow and ice removal contractor to clear snow and ice from the sidewalk.

Under Indiana law, to recover damages in a slip and fall negligence case, a plaintiff must show 1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, 2) the defendant breached that duty, and 3) the plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. Landowners and possessors of land owe persons they invite onto their premises a duty to exercise reasonable care for their protection while they are on the premises. An inviter is subject to liability for physical harm caused to its invitees by a condition on land if it (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees; (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

Indiana Court of Appeals Reverses Trial Court’s Denial of Summary Judgment in Indiana Slip-and-Fall Case

Published on: August 1, 2020 | by Barsumian Armiger

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently found in favor of a restaurant and winery in an Indiana slip-and-fall case. In Cooper’s Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray, the Plaintiff, Katherine Ray, while at Cooper’s Hawk Winery & Restaurant (“Cooper’s Hawk”), went to use the restroom and slipped and fell on her way out of the restroom door. Ray filed a complaint against Cooper’s Hawk alleging she slipped and fell on an accumulation of water and was injured as a result of her fall. Cooper’s Hawk filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied, arguing that Cooper’s Hawk did not have actual or constructive notice of the defective condition that allegedly caused Ray to fall and that any breach of any duty was not the proximate cause of Ray’s injuries.

Under Indiana premises liability law, property owners must maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition for business invitees. A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to its invitees by a condition on land if it (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees; (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. An inviter must exercise reasonable care to discover defects or dangerous conditions on the premises, and will be charged with knowledge of, and held liable for injuries that result from, any dangerous conditions that could have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable care. However, inviters are not insurers of their invitees’ safety and must be shown to have actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous conditions on their premises before liability will attach. Negligence cannot be inferred from the mere fact of a fall and constructive knowledge can only be found if it is shown that a condition had existed for such a length of time that under the circumstances it would have been discovered if the inviter or its agents or employees had used ordinary care.

In this case, it was raining outside around the time of Ray’s fall. Ray testified she did not observe anything, any water, or any wet spots on her way to the restroom. She did not observe any slippery substance or wet spot outside the women’s restroom in the hallway after she exited the restroom. She did not feel any liquid substance or anything like that on her body after she fell. She did not see any wetness on her clothing. While Ray’s husband testified that after EMS arrived he noticed that one of the EMS personnel had a damp knee, Ray’s jeans were damp, and there were a few very small puddles or mist on the floor, he could not testify as to what the liquid was, where it came from, and how long it would have been there, and he did not recall seeing it when he first got to the area of the fall. An employee of Cooper’s Hawk submitted an affidavit stating she was working on the day of the fall, did not know how Ray fell, neither she nor Cooper’s Hawk were notified of the presence and had no knowledge of any type of hazard or liquid substance, employees would inspect the restrooms and hallways every twenty to thirty minutes, and when she inspected the area of the fall, she found no sign of a hazard, water, or other liquid on the floor.

Indiana Court of Appeals Declines to Find Equitable Estoppel for Slip-and-Fall Claimant’s Failure to Comply with Indiana Tort Claims Act Notice Requirement

Published on: April 21, 2020 | by Barsumian Armiger

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently reversed a trial court’s decision allowing a slip-and-fall claimant’s case to move forward against a governmental entity despite non-compliance with the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). In City of Columbus v. Londeree, the Plaintiff, Debra Londeree, slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot of the Foundation for Youth of Bartholomew County (FFY). The City of Columbus (City) provided snow removal services for FFY. After the fall, Debra filed an incident report with FFY. She then spoke with the City’s risk office and was told that the City had not received her incident report. A few weeks later, a City employee called Debra and told her the insurance company would contact her. However, the City’s insurance carrier, Tokio Marine Insurance, never contacted her. FFY’s insurance carrier, Cincinnati Insurance, did contact her, but the claims representative was not working for the City or its insurer and did not tell Debra, who was relying upon the claims representative, that she was working for the City or its insurer.

After Cincinnati Insurance denied the claim on behalf of FFY, Debra and her husband Dan filed a lawsuit against FFY and the City. Neither Debra nor Dan served a notice of tort claim on the City within 180 days from the fall as required by the ITCA. Under the ITCA, a notice of claims against a political subdivision, which includes cities, must be filed with the governing body of the political subdivision and the Indiana political subdivision risk management commission within one hundred eighty (180) days after the loss. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8. A claimant must describe “in a short and plain statement the facts on which the claim is based,” including the circumstances which brought about the loss, the extent of the loss, the time and place the loss occurred, the names of all persons involved if known, the amount of the damages sought, and the residence of the person making the claim at the time of the loss and at the time of filing the notice. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-10.

The City filed a motion for summary judgment against Debra and Dan due to their non-compliance with the notice requirements of the ITCA. The trial court denied the City’s motion as to Debra finding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City should be estopped from raising the ITCA notice defense due to Debra’s understanding of the relationship between the City and FFY and whether her reliance on the representations of FFY and the City were reasonable. As to Dan’s derivative claim, the trial court granted the City’s motion based upon precedent providing that a spouse claiming loss of consortium must file a separate notice of tort claim.