Indiana Court of Appeals Finds DoorDash Owed Duty of Care to Man Injured in Vehicle Crash with DoorDash Driver

In an important legal decision, the Indiana Court of Appeals recently found that DoorDash owed a motorist “a general duty of protection from the risks and dangers of its business model and app which financially incentivize distracted or otherwise dangerous driving.” In Oller v. DoorDash, Inc., Brian Oller (“Oller”) was seriously injured when a DoorDash driver, Trey Culvey (“Culvey”), ran a stop sign and crashed into Oller’s pick-up truck during a delivery. The crash caused Oller’s truck to rotate and barrel roll, ejecting Oller from his truck and pinning him under the truck. Incredibly, Culvey left the scene of the crash on foot to complete the DoorDash order.

Oller survived the crash and filed a lawsuit against Culvey and DoorDash. Among other claims, Oller alleged that DoorDash was independently liable for its own negligence for its business model and app that incentivizes distracted and dangerous driving by “Dashers.” DoorDash, a multi-billion-dollar corporation that conducts business nationwide, including in Indiana, bases its business model for the delivery of food and other items on the speed of deliveries. Dashers are compensated on the volume of orders delivered and the speed with which they deliver them. Dashers use cell phones and DoorDash’s app, which includes a navigational component, to receive and accept orders and communicate with DoorDash and its customers.

In the trial court DoorDash moved for partial judgment on the pleadings under Indiana Trial Rule 12(C). A Trial Rule 12(C) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and is proper only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that under no circumstances could relief be granted. With a Trial Rule 12(C) motion, the material facts alleged in a complaint are accepted as true. In its motion, DoorDash argued that it did not owe a duty to motorists, such as Oller, for its business and business practices. The trial court granted DoorDash’s motion and entered judgment for DoorDash on Oller’s independent negligence claims. Because of the trial court’s decision on DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion, the trial court also denied two motions to compel discovery filed by Oller.

Under Indiana law, personal injury claimants must show (1) a duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damages caused by the breach of duty. Absent a duty of care by a defendant, there can be no breach and therefore no liability. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. When a duty of care is well-established, courts need not redetermine whether a duty exists. However, if a duty has not been previously established, courts determine whether a duty exists by looking at a three-factor test under Webb v. Jarvis that balances (1) the parties’ relationship, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the injured person, and (3) public policy concerns.

Here, DoorDash argued that its lack of duty was well-established, therefore making application of the Webb test unnecessary. Under the Court of Appeals’ previous decision in Williams v. Cingular Wireless, DoorDash argued for a categorical rule that a third-party technology company does not owe a duty to motorists arising out of use of a product available to motorists that motorists choose to use while driving. In Williams, a claimant sued Cingular Wireless for negligence alleging that it supplied a cell phone to an at-fault driver when it knew, or should have known, the phone would be used in the operation of a motor vehicle. The Court in Williams applied the Webb test and found Cingular Wireless owed no duty of care to the claimant. However, the Court here rejected DoorDash’s categorical rule noting Williams involved a fact-specific Webb analysis that did not support a “broad pronouncement that all third-party technology companies do not owe a duty of care to the general motoring public regardless of the product they make available to motorists.” The Court of Appeals noted that DoorDash not only makes its app available to motorists, but it also requires and incentivizes Dashers to use its app while making deliveries. Accepting Oller’s allegations as true, the Court found DoorDash to be a much more involved third-party technology company whose business practices and app actively encourage distracted and dangerous driving.

Finding no established duty, or lack of duty, the Court balanced the three factors in the Webb test, ultimately finding they weighed in favor of a duty of care.

The Court found an indirect relationship between DoorDash and Oller because DoorDash conducts its business on public roads through its Dashers, directing Dashers to take the fastest routes possible and financially incentivizing speed and use of its app. Nonetheless, the Court noted that this first factor had little if any weight due to the attenuated nature of the relationship. 

As to the second factor, the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the injured person, the Court considered, consistent with Indiana law, (1) the broad type of plaintiff and (2) the broad type of harm, whereby courts, without analyzing the specific facts of the occurrence, assess whether there is some probability or likelihood of harm that is serious enough to make a reasonable person take precautions to avoid it. Here, the Court found the general motoring public to be the broad type of plaintiff and a collision with a delivery network driver (an individual who provides delivery services using a personal vehicle through a digital network) to be the broad type of harm. The Court found a collision with a delivery network driver is a “predictable byproduct of a delivery network company’s business,” as delivery companies, like DoorDash, supply digital networks to drivers to provide for deliveries and “must routinely contemplate, and even potentially require, that their drivers will personally use mobile devices to access those networks while driving.” The Court also found that a reasonable person would undoubtedly take precautions to avoid the anticipated, serious consequences of such collisions. Therefore, the Court concluded it was reasonably foreseeable that DoorDash’s business model and app would lead to a wreck between one of its drivers and another motorist, weighing in favor of a duty of care by DoorDash.

As to the third factor, public policy, the Court noted that “Indiana’s motorists have a reasonable and justifiable expectation that delivery network companies like DoorDash will conduct their operations in a reasonably safe manner, that is, without encouraging and financially incentivizing distracted and otherwise dangerous driving.” While DoorDash did not control Culvey or his vehicle and Culvey had his own personal and independent duty to drive safely, the Court found “the buck does not stop with Culvey.” DoorDash’s business financially incentivizes its drivers to deliver as many orders as possible and to use DoorDash’s app while doing so. “Indiana law cannot and does not countenance such inducements when the consequences, as alleged in Oller’s complaint, are so readily apparent and significant.” The Court also noted DoorDash is in a better position to mitigate risks and prevent future injuries arising from its business model and app, recognizing a duty would not make DoorDash strictly liable and the duty is not a blanket duty but only a duty to not financially incentivize dangerous conduct that would harm motorists.

Finding that DoorDash owed Oller a duty of care, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision granting DoorDash’s Trial Rule 12(C) motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to deny DoorDash’s motion and reconsider Oller’s motions to compel discovery from DoorDash.

You can read the full opinion here.