Indiana Supreme Court Tinkers with Bright-Line “Reece Rule” for Landowner Duties Regarding Visual Obstructions on Land Adjacent to Indiana Roadways

The Indiana Supreme Court recently clarified the “Reece rule,” established by the Court in Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 173 N.E.3d 1031 (Ind. 2021), which provides that landowners in Indiana owe a duty to passing motorists on adjacent highways not to create hazardous conditions that visit themselves upon the roadway; but when a land use or condition that may impose a visual obstruction is wholly contained on a landowner’s property, there is no duty to the traveling public.

In Martinez v. Smith, Yerano Martinez (“Martinez”) collided with a truck and suffered severe injuries after driving through a stop sign obstructed by an overgrown bush on property owned by Jeffrey Smith (“Smith”). While the bush did not intrude upon the travelled portion of the roadway, it did partially extend into Miami County’s right-of-way, an easement where the stop sign was located. Martinez argued the bush was not “wholly contained” on Smith’s property because it was within Miami County’s right-of-way. Smith argued there was a difference between a public right-of-way, that is, a roadway, and a county right-of-way easement. Based upon Reece, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Smith, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court had to decide, therefore, what it meant when it referred to the “roadway” in Reece. 

Ultimately, the Indiana Supreme Court held the “Reece rule” encompasses, not only encroachments upon the paved portion of the roadway, but also hazardous conditions obstructing traffic control devices in the public right of way. First, looking at Indiana’s common law and various dictionary and statutory definitions, the Court found the terms “roadway” and “public right of way” are not limited to the paved portion of the roadway. Second, the Court agreed with Martinez that a stop sign, like any traffic control device, is part of the roadway as an integral part of the roadway, without which the roadway simply cannot function. Third, the Court noted that its clarification of the “Reece rule” comes with no additional burden to Indiana landowners; it does not change the bright-line rule established in Reece, but simply “clarifies where, under [the] bright-line rule, the landowner’s responsibility begins and where it ends.” 

The Indiana Supreme Court next applied the clarified “Reece rule” to the facts in this case. Although the parties disputed whether the bush was “wholly contained” on Smith’s property, Smith had admitted that his bush fell within the county right-of-way. Under the Court’s holding clarifying the “Reece rule,” the condition was not therefore “wholly contained” on his property. Reversing the trial court’s decision, the Court concluded that “under Reece, a landowner’s common-law duty to refrain from creating hazardous conditions for passing motorists on adjacent highways encompasses traffic-control devices within the public right-of-way,” and “because the hazardous condition here, by Smith’s own admission, impermissibly encroached into the public right-of-way,” “the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in [Smith’s] favor.”

You can read the full opinion here, along with Justice Molter’s concurring separate opinion in which he discusses a “law-and-economics approach” based on the legally famous Learned Hand formula of balancing the burden of taking precautions against the probability and gravity of harm, and Justice Slaughter’s dissent with separate opinion in which he faults the majority for eschewing common law precedent and relying on irrelevant dictionary definitions and inapposite statutes.